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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

JOAN B. _l\IOORE,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

PRUDENTIAL INSURANCE
COl\'IP ANY OF AMERICA,
Defendant-Appellant.

12388

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT

POINT I
"DELIVERY" IS NOT "ACCEPTANCE"
'YI'rHIN THE POLICY TERMS
Respondent has argued that delivery of the policy
in question was effective in law when mailed to the
agent. This Court stated in Jones v. New York Life Insurance Co., 69 U.172, 253 P.200, (1927), that:

1

It was within the rights of, and was competent
for, the parties to provide in the application under
what conditions and at what time t,he policy
should become effective and binding.

See also Sterling v. Lodge, 28 U. 505, 80 P.375
(1905), White v. Metropolitan Life Insurance
Co., 63 U.272, 224 P.1106 (1924)
Where a policy application contains as a condition precedent the acceptance of the policy by the insured during
his lifetime, performance thereof is a prerequisite to the
taking effect of insurance coverage. Machinery Center,
Inc. v. Anchor National Life Insurance Co., 434 F.2d
(10th Cir. 1970), (applying Utah law). There are no
provisions in the Prudential application which would
lead to a conclusion that an interim contract was intended
by the parties.
And there are no prov1s10ns in the agreement
which would lead to a conclusion that an interim
contract was intended by the parties. There are
other clearly prescribed conditions within the
agreement than the payment of the premium and
delivery of the receipt to the applicant, which lead
only to the conclusion that the applicant was
merely applying for a contract of insurance which
could be consummated only upon the fulfilment
of the conditions set out in the application. And
where a policy application contains such conditions precedent, performance thereof is a prerequisite to taking effect of insurance coverage.
The first part of the agreement gave notice to the
applicant that the insurance applied for would
not go into force until and unless the policy was
delivered to and received Ly the applicant.
2

Upon meeting all of these conditions the policy
would then be made effective as of the date indicated under Part 3 of the application. Mofrad v.
New York Life Insurance Co., 206 ]'.2d 491
(10th Cir. 1953), (applying Utah law).
Respondent misconceives Appellant's position by
arguing that delivery of the policy is unnecessary to complete a contract. The contract terms require acceptance
of the policy, not "acceptance of delivery of the policy."
(Respondent's Brief, p. 8). It is apparent that the policy
contains many more provisions than the application. The
application is an offer to purchase a policy. The policy is
not reviewed by the applicant before delivery to him,
after which he may then either accept or reject it. If he
accepts it, the contract is complete. If he rejects it, there
is, of course, no contract and the premium is returned.
The question is not one of taking premiums without giving protection; it is simply a matter of contract law as to
whether or not certain conditions precedent have been
met. In this case, they were not.
The general rule is that physical delivery is unnecessary to complete an insurance contract, unless the
policy states to the contrary. Even if, therefore, the acceptance provision is read as a delivery provision, no contract arose by its very terms, absent delivery.
By the terms of the application delivery was made
a condition precedent of the inception of the policies-a valid requirement. (Cases cited) Mutual
Life Insurance Company of New York v. Anderson, -1<08 S'V2d 335 (Tex. 1966). See also
Loveless v. Life and Casualty Insurance Co. of
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Tenn., 147 SE2d 835 (Ga. 1966), Hadler v.
Great Eastern Life lnsu.,rance Co., 256 A.2d 650
(N.H. 1969).
That such is also the lmv in Utah is apparent from reading Lombard v. Colu,mbia National Life Insurance Co.,
50 U.554, 168 P.269 (1917), cited by Respondent
for the proposition that delivery is not necessary. In
Lombard) a receipt was given tu the insured stating that
if the policy were issued, it would be in force. Since a
policy was issued prior to the applicant's death, the Court
ruled that the intent expressed compelled holding the insurer liable. "To say the least, the neglect or omission of
the agent under such circmnstances to perform the manual act of placing the policy in the hands of the insured
will not serve to suspend or postpone the obligation of
the company upon its contract." (Emphasis added).
Lombard v. Columbia National Life Insurance Co., 168
P. at p. 271. No such neglect existed in the case at bar
and the parties' intent, as gathered from the policy terms,
is that acceptance by the insured was a condition precedent to coverage. Those terms may not be ignored, but
must be given effect. White v. 1lfetropolitan Life Insurance Co., supra, 224 P. 1106 at pp. 1109-1110.
Aside from the failure of acceptance, the continued
truthfulness and completeness of the insured' s answers
was also under the policy terms, a condition precedent
to coverage. Such terms are in the nature of a good
health clause. The validity of such clauses as conditions
precedent is generally unquestioned. Wolk: v. Lamar
Life Insurance Co., 202 So.2d 617 (Fla. 1967). Also,
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their validity is a matter of contract not dependent upon
questions of innocent or fraudulent misrepresentation
by the insured. Bryant v. Standard Life and Accident
Insurance Co., 348 F.2d 649 (5th Cir. 1965) at p. 655.
If the words of the application, being unambiguous and
clear, are not to be wholly discounted, it is apparent that
no insurance came into effect prior to the applicant's
death, and that the interim insurance for which Respondent contends was neither agreed to nor intended.

POINT II
THE JURY CANNOT FIND THE OPPOSITE OF DR. DOl\LM'S UNCONTRADICTED
TESTIMONY BY DISREGARDING IT.
Respondent contends that Prudential's witness as
to materiality and good faith refusal was not qualified
and that the jury was entitled to find the contrary of his
uncontradicted credible testimony. Dr. Domm, without
objection, contradiction or attack by way of cross examination, testified that in his 24 years experience with Prudential, he was familiar with the duties and practices of
the underwriting department, that the underwriter assigned to Ridd' s application had recently died and that
under company practices and procedures in force in
1967, as to an application similar to that submitted by
Ridd, a policy would have issued from the underwriting
department because nothing of significance appeared requiring medical confirmation from treating doctors or
risk appraisal by the medical director. R-418, 430, 431,

5

434. If on the other hand, any indication of the information derived by investigation after Ridd' s death had been
available to Prudential before death, no policy would
have issued at the time of death because:
1. Mailed inquiries on standard forms would have

been mailed to Dr. Jones and Dr. Hughes and
would not yet have been returned. ( R-443) .
2. Dr. Domm would have declined to issue the policy based on the available medical information.
(R-441-44,).
Medical testimony was unanimous on the risk factors
presented by cataplexy and Respondent's counsel did not
attack the materiality of cataplexy to the risk insured or
the good faith refusal of Prudential, but only whether or
not Douglas Ridd, might have been unaware of the significance of the symptoms. ( R-446-453) .
Accordingly, there is no inference for the jury by
Prudential's failure to call an underwriter. The disease,
beingtsual, was unfamiliar to the underwriting department in which event the practice was to remit the application to the medical department for evaluation. ( R442) . Prudential called the most knowledgeable witness
available to prove its medical and underwriting practices
regarding a clean application as well as one containing
symptoms of cataplexy. This Court may take judicial
notice that an insurance company would not issue identical life insurance coverage to both a cataplectic and a
person of normal health. Hartford Accident Indem-
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nity Co. v. JJf cCullouyh, 44 Cal Rptr. 915 ( 1965) at p.
922; Dowling v. Mutual Life Insurance Company of
New York, 168 So.2d 107 (La. Hl64); Olson v. Hertz
Corporation, 133 NW2d 519 (.Minn. 1965); Hein v.
Family Life Insurance Co., 376 P.2d 152 (Wash. 1962).

This Court may also judicially notice that an insurer relies upon statements in written applications for life insurance and that before issuing a policy, a carrier considers evidence of the applicant's insurability. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Jankowski, 280 N'V 766
(Mich. 1938); Rosenblou1n v. New York Life Insurance
Co., 65 F.Supp 692 (Mo. 1946). It is indisputable,
therefore, from the evidence that the policy upon which
suit is here brought would not have been issued had full
disclosure been made.
The cases cited by Respondent for the proposition
that a jury may disregard intrinsically credible and uncontradicted evidence upon an issue are not in point. In
Hollandv. Brown, 15 U.2d 422, 394 P.2d 77 (1964) the
evidence concerned damages allegedly sustained by a
cooking-ware distributor because of a purchaser's disavowal of the contract. There was strong evidence contradicting the loss, the merchandise having been retained
in stock and sold to others at the full price. In the \Veber
Uasin and Toma cases, the evidence also was in dispute
and the jury weighed and sifted among alternatives as
was its prerogative.
Of cases cited by Prudential, the following specifi<.'.ally hold that undisputed expert testimony as to the
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materiality of misrepresentations compels judgment in
favor of the insurer.
( 1) Campbell v. Prudential Insurance, 155 N.E.2d
9 (Ill. 1959) :

In our opinion the Appellate Court correctly held
that a verdict should have been directed for the
defendant. The testimony of defendant's expert
witness relating to the materiality of the misrepresentations to the acceptance of the risk, was
undisputed. ( p. 11) .
(2) Continental Casualty Cornpany v. Mulligan,
460 P.2d 27, (Ariz. 1969):

The uncontradicted and unimpeached testimony
of defendant's chief underwriter clearly showed
... the policies would not have been issued to an
applicant for insurance who had shown a series of
excessive blood pressure readings, as did plaintiff. In view of this testimonv, the materialitv of
plaintiff's misrepresentation; and nondisclos{ires
cannot seriously be questioned.
(3) Tolar v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 80

:N".E.2d 53, (N.Y. 1948):

"\Vhen we examine the nncontroverted proof that
the answers given concealed the fact of prior medical consultation which led to a discovery of the
heart condition and that the practice of the company was to reject nonmedical applications containing such information, it inevitably follows that
the statutory definition of materiality is met and
no further proof is needed that the false answers
constituted "a misrepresentation that the applicant has not had the disease ... which was discovered.
8

( 4) _Delaney v. Prudential Insurance Company of

America, 139 N.,V.2d 48 ('Vise. 1966):

And, crucially, there was uncontradicted testimony by appellant's witnesses that these misrepresentations increased the risk. 'Vithout competing
testimony to bring about a jury question, we hold
that such evidence increased the risk as a matter
of law, thus voiding the policy.
(5) New York Life Insurance Company

12 :N.,V.2d, 530 (N.D. 1944):

v. Fleck,

The uncontradicted testimony offered by the
plaintiff is that in approving the application the
company relied "principally upon the answers
given by Fleck in his application dated September 30, 1939"; and the officer whose business it
was to pass upon applications had no "reason to
believe that the ans\vers given in that application
were untrue, false, or incomplete." Further that
the application would have been declined had the
company known from any source "that in August, 1939, Fleck had consulted a physician who
had found enlarged glands in the right side of the
neck and who, after having a pathologist's examination
,, made, had a diagnosis of Hodgkins Disease.
The record is undisputed that the company knew
nothing about the falsity of these statements contained in the application until the proofs of death
were furnished.
(6) Fjeseth

v. New York Life Insurance Com-

pany, 122 N'V2d, 49 (\Vise. 1963) :

Dr. Jernigan, defendant's associate medical director, testified that had defendant received in-
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formation of the provisional diagnosis of angina
pectoris, it would have declined the application.
No eYidence was adduced that this would not be
in accord with the practice generally fallowed by
life insurance companies.
By contrast, respondent's case rests chiefly upon permitting the jury to find that Ridd made substantially
correct answers to the medical questionnaire and did not
intend to deceive the company. As noted in Appellant's
brief, the evidence there, too, is undisputed and amounts
to legal fraud.
The evidence recounted is undisputed, so that it
is established as a fact that when Jessen stated
that he had never consulted a physician or specialist for, or had suffered from, any ailment or disease of the heart, blood vessels or lungs, when he
represented that no one had found his blood pressure abnormal or unusual and when he stated that
he never had pains or discomfort in his chest or
shortness of breath, he was not telling the truth.
Jessen v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 209 F.2d
453 (7th Cir. 1954).
Even if, however, the question of the application's falsity
is a jury question, there is none about the fact that Ridd's
answers were not complete, as certified by him. In
Fjeseth v. New York Life Insurance Co., 122 NW2d
49 ("Tise. 1963) the Court accepted the jury's finding
that the applicant in good faith did not believe his health
had changed prior to the effective date of the policies:
Nevertheless, we do not deem such good-faith belief, that the condition of his health had not
changed since .l\Iay 27th, material on the issue of
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whether he had a duty to disclose to defendant or
its agent the fact of the chest pains, the consultations with, and examination by, Dr. Pribek, and
the provisional diagnosis of angina pectoris.
Even if Ridd honestly did not believe he had any indication of a nervous disorder, dizzy spells, loss of consciousness, disease or disorder of the nervous system, or any
known indication of any physical disorder, deformity,
defect or abnormality not already disclosed to Dr. Jung,
he had a duty to disclose to Dr. Jung that he went to Dr.
Jones by reason of sudden loss of muscle tone within two
months prior to making application for)>licy and not to
say that a routine physical examination found him in
good health, particularly since it is undisputed that Dr.
Jones told Ridd he had an incurable condition. It is obvious Ridd had the purpose and diagnosis of Jones' examination in mind when he mentioned his name. If his
symptoms were unusual enough to consult a physician,
he was bound to know that Prudential would deem them
material, particularly in light of the questions touching
on "any physical disorder, deformity, defect or abnormality." (Ex. 4-d). One is presumed to know those
things that he should know or had the opportunity to
know. Industrial Commission of Utah v. Murray City,
55 U 525, 188 P.274 (1920).
Furthermore it was Respondent's burden, once Prudential offered uncontradicted evidence that the policy
would not have been issued upon a full disclosure by
Ridd, to show either that Prudential had not acted in
good faith or that other insurance companies would have
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issued a policy
(Instruction No. 11, R-237).

symptoms of cataplexy.

The burden is on respondents to prove that the
temporary insurance provided by the receipt was
in force when Bruce died. They must thus prove
that in the opinion of the proper officers of petitioner Bruce was insurable and acceptable on
the date of completion of his medical examination.
They are confronted with the letter from petitioner stating that it had determined that Bruce
was not insurable and acceptable. If respondents
are to prevail they must obtain a fact finding that
the determination was not made in good faith. In
addition, they must obtain a fact finding from a
preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably
prudent and careful authorized officer of petitioner company, acting in good faith, would, on
the evidence available, find that Bruce was on the
date of the completion of his medical examination
insurable and acceptable for insurance under petitioner's rules and practices on the plan of insurance, for the amount of insurance and at the premium rate set in his application for life insurance.
United Founders Life Insurance Company v.
Carey, 363 S"\V2d 236 (Tex. 1963).

* * * * *

Dr. Jernigan, defendant's associate medical director, testified that had defendant received information of the provisional diagnosis of angina
pectoris, it would have declined the application.
No eYidence was adduced that this would not be
in accord with the practice generally followed by
life insurance companies. F}eseth v. New York
Life Insurance Company, supra, 122 N"\V2d at
p. 55.

* * * * *
12

In an attempt to raise a jury question, respondent, relying on the testimony of Dr. Henske, her
physician, that since none of her condition was
actually serious and since she was in good health
in 1963, argues that the jury could have inferred
that the policy would have been issued even if all
her hospitalizations were known. In the absence
of qualified testimony to the effect that persons
engaged in the same type of insurance business,
acting reasonably and naturally in accordance
with the practice usual in the insurance industry,
would have issued the policy even in the face of
these misrepresentations, there is no basis for
drawing any such inference and no jury question
is presented. Delaney v. Prudential Insurance
Company of America, supra.
Having failed to offer any evidence of bad faith or
bad practice on the part of Prudential, Respondent cannot carry her burden by saying the jury could and did
disbelieve Dr. Domm, solely because he was employed by
Prudential. Respondent needed to prove and now contends that she did prove the exact opposite of Dr.
Domm' s testimony without offering any evidence. The
contention is without merit:
"The mere fact that the testimony of a witness is
not believed does not of itself warrant a finding in
direct opposition to such testimony. * * * For example a jury is not warranted in assuming that
because they decide the defendant's narrative is
false, the converse of such narrative must be true
without any further examination of the testimony." Chapman v. Troy Laundry Co., 87 U 15,
47 P.2d 1054 (1935).
In any event, there is a legal presumption of good faith
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on the part of Prudential, which Respondent has not
even attempted to rebut. Utah National Bank v. Nelson, 38 U lu9, 111 P.907 ( 1910), Boyle v. Baggs, 10
U.2d 203, 350 P.2d 622 (1960) at p. 624. Finally, Dr.
Damm was not stating inadmissible opinion, but was describing the practices and procedures of Prudential's
underwriting and medical departments in July of 1967
with which, there was no dispute, he was \vell familiar.
(R-441). The opinions he gave as a medical expert were,
of course, admissible and not only uncontradicted but
corroborated by Drs. Jones, Hughes and Jung. (Instruction No. 9, R-235).
POINT III
THE COURT'S INSTRUCTION
13 EMBODIES A REPEALED STATUTORY
STANDARD.
This is a case of first impression in Utah as to the
construction and effect of the current §31-19-8 UCA
1953. Under §31-19-8 an applicant does not warrant the
accuracy of his statements in applying for insurance.
Therefore, errors in the application are a defense only if
fraudulent or material or the basis of a good faith refusal to issue the policy. Respondent would have this
court ignore the plain wording of the statute and require
proof of an intent to deceive before recovery could be defeated. No authority has been offered in support of such
a radical suggestion. That which Respondent has offered
at page 12 of her brief is obsolete, having been decided
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under a statute, now repealed, which this Court interpreted as requiring intent to deceive in order to defeat
recovery.

Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 19 U.2d 119,
427 P.2d 387 (1967) cited by Respondent, involved the
predecessor statute to §31-19-8. In addition, the plaintiff had made a full disclosure of her prior history to her
brother-in-law, an insurance agent of long acquaintance,
and had signed the policy application in blank. The misrepresentation, being supplied by the insurer's own agent
unknown to the insured, was, of course, not fraudulent.
The Court further noted the absence of an applicant's
certificate that the answers were true and complete.
Since the answers were not given by the applicant and
not certified as true, the insurer could not prove any misrepresentation, particularly one that was fraudulent.
Wooton v. Combined Insurance Company of America,
16 lT .2d 52, 395 P .2d 724 ( 1964) is also not in point,
having been decided under the predecessor statute. Also,
there was not shown an intent to defraud (deemed necessary to defeat recovery under the predecessor statute)
since full disclosure of the applicant's prior polio was
made and a polio exclusion inserted in the policy. PritCasualty Co., 18 U.2d 279,
chett v. Equitable Life
421 P.2d 943 (1966), also involved the predecessor statute. The applicant there made a full disclosure to the
company's agent who edited the information. Even had
a full disclosure been made, the company would have
attached a rider excluding the problems concealed but
not the cancer of which the applicant died. There is no

15

similarity in either the facts or the law between those
cases cited by Respondent and the case at bar.
"Instruction number l.J." in the fourth line on page
43 of Appellant's brief should read "Instruction number
13," as it does at page 20 of Appellant's brief. As to Instruction number 13 and its gloss of knowingness, Appellant strenuously excepted since there is no warrant
either by statute or case law for instructing the jury
that the §31-19-8 statutory defense could not be invoked
by Prudential unless it proved that any omission or incorrect statement by the applicant was either deliberate
or reckless. ( R-467 -468) . The instruction was tantamount to saying that an omission or incorrect statement
had to be made with intent to deceive in order to qualify
as a statutory defense. The Utah legislature clearly removed "intent to deceive" as a necessary prerequisite to
defeating recovery by its repeal of §31-19-8 in 1963 and
the passage of the present statute. For comparison, the
predecessor §31-19-8 is as follows:

(1) Except as provided in subsection ( 2) , no

oral or written misrepresentation or warranty made in the negotiation of an insurance
contract, by the insured or in his behalf, shall
be deemed material or defeat or avoid the
contract or prevent it attaching, unless such

misrepresentation or warranty is made with
the intent to deceive.

The insured shall have the burden of proof
that such misrepresentation or warranty was
not made with intent to deeeive.
(2) In any a pplica ti on for life or disability insuranec made in writing by the insured, all
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statements therein made by the insured shall,
in the absence of fraud, be deemed representations and not warranties. The falsity of any
such statement shall not bar the right to recovery under the contract unless it materially
affected either the acceptance of the risk or
the hazard assumed by the insurer. (Emphasis added)
The predecessor statute may have seemed ambiguous to
some as to whether the materiality of any misrepresentation would defeat recovery without an intent to deceive.
In construing the statute this Court required an intent
to deceive, although such intent was usually inferred as a
matter of law where the misrepresentation was clearly
material. Theros v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 17
U .2d 205, 407 P .2d 685 ( 1965) . See the Marks, Wooton
and Pritchett cases relied on by Respondent and discussed by Appellant at page 15 herein. Predecessor
§31-19-8 discussed only misrepresentations and warranties. It did not mention omissions, concealment of facts,
or incorrect statements. Nor did it mention the defense
of good faith refusal. All of these items were part of the
new statute in 1963. In the new statute, the "intent to
deceive" defense persists, now labelled "fraudulent." As
Respondent notes, it pertains to the state of mind of the
applicant. Added, however, are clearly disjunctive defenses of ( l) materiality of the error to acceptance of the
risk and (2) good faith refusal by the insurer. These defenses, particularly the latter, pertain exclusively to the
good faith judgment of the insurer. Respondent could
have raised the good faith issue by cross-examination or
by showing that Prudential's ref us al was out of line with
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the practice of comparabie carriers, but nothing was
offered to contradict Prudential's evidence of good faith
or to rebut the legal presumption thereof.
The new statute reflects the legislature's understanding that it is the insurer's prerogative to know all
that the applicant knows or should know, so as to select
among its risks and determine the proper coverage and
premium rate. An insurance carrier is, and always has
been, protected under the common law from fraudulent
applications. By §31-19-8, it is also protected from incorrect and incomplete applications, occurring for whatever reason, so long as it is reasonable in saying that the
error was material to its acceptance of the risk, or that
it in good faith would not have issued the policy given
accurate and full disclosure. In underwriting terms, the
effect on the carrier, whether the faulty application arose
by design or accident, is the same. The new §31-19-8
accords Utah law to the general rule and reiterates the
maxim that where both parties to a transaction act in
good faith, the one whose error or oversight is at issue
should bear the loss. Respondent's position that Prudential should insure not only Ridd's life, but his memory
and veracity as well, is without support in law, equity,
or reason.
Respectfully Submitted,
THOMAS BURTON of
YAN COTT, BAGLEY,
CORNWALL & McCARTHY
Suite 300, lil East 1st South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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